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Abstract
Plagues and pandemics are no longer distant thoughts of the past. Previously 
referred as moments in history, infectious diseases have re-emerged as potential 
existential threats to mankind. International Health Security researchers have 
repeatedly warned society about impending pandemics and in 2020, the world 
experienced its first major pandemic in over a century. The SARS-CoV-2/COVID-
19 pandemic came fast and hit hard, impacting the entire world within months of 
discovery. Although SARS-CoV-2 was a completely novel virus, there are an assort-
ment of novel and timeworn pathogens fostering the potential to become the next 
pandemic. This chapter focuses on pathogens ranging from yeast to virus, capable 
of transmission through food, water, air, or animal, that could emerge as the next 
International Health Security threat.
Keywords: pandemic, vector-borne diseases, airborne diseases, waterborne diseases, 
foodborne diseases, public health, infectious diseases, International Health Security
1. Introduction
The current COVID-19 pandemic has given the world a new lesson that the 
war against human pathogens is not over. The next plagues are coming, that is for 
sure, we just do not know when and where they will emerge. The transcontinental 
global movement of human populations, animals, products, and food in unprec-
edented numbers and at immeasurable speeds has determined the emergence of 
new plagues. The International Health Security panorama is changing with the 
incorporation of vast geographical areas to the agroindustry; the displacement of 
large population groups either due to problems of floods, drought, wars, or people 
that search for better living conditions. In addition, the disposal of biological waste 
and the weaponization of pathogenic microorganisms are phenomena with seri-
ous consequences. International multinational cooperation is needed to improve 
the development and availability of drugs and vaccines at a global level, as well as, 
improving preventive health services, keeping safe all repositories of infectious 
agents, and the establishment of an International Health Security System focused 
on Infectious Disease Surveillance and Control.
2. Methods
An organized, systematic, four-step methodology for collecting key informa-
tion was carried out to write this chapter. In a first step a search in websites such 
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as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) was conducted to 
identify emerging infectious diseases pathogens. In a second step, the main emerg-
ing infectious diseases pathogens were classified in viruses, bacteria, parasites and 
fungi as well as by their mechanism of transmission. In a third step, all updated 
manuscripts related with each one the selected pathogens were extracted from 
scientific databases including Pubmed, MEDLINE, Google Scholar, and SCOPUS. 
Finally, all pathogens were classified using the WHO Pandemic Phase Descriptions 
and Main Actions by Phase [1].
3. Pathogens to study
3.1 Vector-borne
Vector-borne diseases are transmitted, either biologically or mechanically, via 
insect vectors or animal vectors. Vector-borne diseases were the cause of great 
plagues in the previous centuries and continue to take human lives every year. 
Although the invention of pesticides, better hygiene and sanitation, and improved 
physical barriers have contributed to the decreased incidence of these type of 
infections, globalization, deforestation, and global warming are causing Vector-
borne diseases to experience a comeback [2]. With enough conditions in their favor, 
Vector-borne diseases are capable to expand from being endemic in some areas to 
becoming a pandemic. Vectors range from insects to mammals and are present in 
all parts of the world. The pathogens described in this section are transmitted by 
mosquitoes, ticks, rodents, lice, and fleas.
An important factor regarding Vector-borne diseases and their respective vectors 
compared to other mechanisms of infectious disease transmission (e.g., airborne, 
foodborne) is the emerging data indicating vectors are capable of hosting more 
than one pathogen at a time [3–7]. Co-transmission and co-infection are not well 
understood yet are raising questions regarding clinical manifestation, virulence, 
and possible future implications. Although the mechanisms of co-infections are not 
well comprehended, there are documented case reports with individuals present-
ing more than one Vector-borne disease at the same time [8–10]. Specifically, there 
is rising concern about mosquitoes and their capability to co-infect humans, with 
recent studies showing Aedes aegypti [4, 7] and Ae. albopictus [3] capable of trans-
mitting Zika, Chikungunya, and Dengue viruses within one bite.
3.1.1 Viruses
3.1.1.1 Yellow fever virus
Yellow fever (YF), one of the deadliest infectious diseases less than a century ago 
[11], was historically a neglected infectious disease unit the 1902 creation of the Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO) and International Sanitary Bureau of the 
American Republics [12]. Yellow fever is caused by the etiological agent yellow fever 
virus (YFV), belongs to the flavivirus genus and, is a part of the arboviruses group 
(i.e., a commonly used, yet unofficial, name for viruses transmitted by arthropods). 
[11]. YFV circulates between humans, non-human primates, and several species of 
mosquito vectors (Aedes, Haemagogus, Saberges). Currently, YFV has not adapted as 
well to humans as Dengue virus, leaving YFV as a zoonotic disease but with a future 
capability to extend to an anthroponotic. In the past decade there is an increase in 
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concern of non-primate transmission which could go unnoticed and spillover to 
large human populations [13]. Due to the nature of the virus requiring epizootic 
transmission, unfortunately, YFV cannot be eradicated from the planet. Aedes 
aegypti and Aedes albopictus which are present in over 150 countries suggest nearly 
half of the global population is at risk of YFV transmission [14]. Traditionally, 
YF affects the Americas and the African continent with its warm temperatures 
and suitable habitat for the mosquito vectors of the virus. There are seven major 
genotypes of YFV, differentiating the American and African cases – with 5 circulat-
ing within Africa and 2 in the Americas. Depending on the location of cases and 
the type of mosquito species native to the area there are three main types of YF 
transmission – urban, sylvatic, and intermediate (only Africa). Urban transmission 
is caused mainly by Aedes aegypti or a similar urban mosquito as the transmitter 
in humans [11, 15]. Sylvatic transmission appears between non-human primates 
and sylvatic mosquitoes, typically apart of the Haemagogus or Sabethes genera. In 
Africa alone, YF is estimated to kill over 70 thousand individuals a year [16]. The 
case fatality rate (CFR) depends on the location of infection, with South America 
having a higher CFR (40–60%) compared to Africa (closer to 20%) [17]. However, 
most cases are mild and resolve with supportive care. Moreover, in areas with 
co-transmission of both Dengue and YF viruses, it is possible that previous Dengue 
infections may protect against severe YF infections [18]. Similarly, to how YFV is 
thought to have traveled from the African continent to the West Indies centuries 
ago on shipping routes, it is capable to continue expanding in the current age with 
increased globalization and construction within the vector habitat. As mentioned 
above, YF is endemic in mostly South American and Africa, with outbreaks consis-
tently seen each year. Although not often heard about in North America and Asian 
countries, Yellow Fever was endemic hundreds of years ago in cities like New York, 
Philadelphia, Memphis, and New Orleans [19] and has the possibility to emerge in 
Asian countries [20, 21]. Although Aedes mosquitoes are also native in parts of Asia, 
the absence of YF cases has long been a scientific enigma [21, 22]. Common theo-
ries to the lack of YF cases in Asia are: the east African mountain range provides a 
natural barrier for Asia [21], competition with Dengue virus limits YF transmission 
[23], and vector competency [20] among others. However, in the recent years an 
increased number of imported YF cases into Asian countries have raised alarms to 
the potential introduction of YFV to the local environment [20]. The most impor-
tant factor describing whether or not YFV will be transmitted in a specific area 
is the vector. Fortunately, YFV can only be transmitted via the bite of an infected 
mosquito, making mosquito control programs essential in YFV transmission 
reduction. However, the world currently is experiencing a re-emergence of YF due 
to increased globalization, deforestation, and climate change, with recent outbreaks 
occurring in Brazil [24, 25]. With globalization, both humans and mosquitos may 
hitch rides to different parts of the world where YF transmission is uncommon 
and becoming an International Health Security issue. Furthermore, the present 
deforestation occurring throughout the world, especially in the South American 
and African forests, is closing the distance between humans, infected non-human 
primates, and mosquitos. Lastly, the increasing temperatures seen due to climate 
change may have implications on YFV vectors and their global distribution [16] – 
increasing the risk for contracting YF. In a recent study, an increase in temperature 
is estimated to increase the chance of the annual amount of YF death by over 90% 
[16]. Currently, countries with endemic YFV transmission have mosquito control 
programs capable of decreasing/controlling mosquito populations. Furthermore, 
the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) in conjunction with mathematical 
models [11] assist in predicting future YF outbreaks and viral transmission [16]. 
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Lastly, one of the most important tools available to fight infectious diseases exists 
against the Yellow Fever virus – a vaccine. The earliest version of a YF live-attenu-
ated vaccine was created in 1936 and the same vaccine strain (17D) is still presently 
effective and used in areas with endemic transmission [11].
3.1.1.2 Dengue virus
Dengue virus (DENV) occurs in over 100 countries causing nearly 100 million 
acute infections and half a million deaths each year [26, 27]. The disease itself is 
characterized by an acute fever which is transmitted from mosquitos (Ae. aegypti 
and Ae. albopictus) to humans, however, most cases are asymptomatic. Anywhere 
from 5–20% of cases progress to severe dengue which includes bleeding, shock, 
organ failure, and death. Severe forms of Dengue are known as dengue hemorrhagic 
fever (DHF) and dengue shock syndrome (DSS). Dengue is described as early as 
1600 and continues to be endemic to many parts of the world [27]. Similarly, to the 
Yellow Fever efforts initiated by PAHO, a major Aedes aegypti eradication program 
between 1947 and 1970 aimed to eliminate this mosquito species and therefore, 
eliminate Dengue. However, Ae. aegypti reinfestation occurred shortly after and 
has even increased in dispersion in the recent decades [27]. Like other infectious 
diseases, Dengue is thought as an exotic disease – perhaps many individuals have 
not even heard of Dengue before. It may surprise many individuals in developed 
countries that Dengue’s main vector Ae. aegypti is capable of living in almost all con-
tinents except Antarctica [28]. Dengue was common in port cities in the Caribbean 
and all throughout the Americas and continues to cause outbreaks in developed 
areas such as the Florida (2020) and Hawaii (2015) [29]. A significant barrier in 
the diagnosis and reporting of Dengue is the commonality the disease shares with 
other Flaviviruses such as Yellow Fever virus and Zika and its cross-reactivity in 
serological testing. The aforementioned diseases share similar flu-like symptoms 
and serological misdiagnoses are believed to fuel the underreporting of DENV and 
other Flavivirus infections. As Dengue cases continue to increase it is essential to 
understand the current epidemiology and public health programs in place to reduce 
the outbreak risk and reinforce International Health Security. Dengue virus shares 
many similar characteristics with YFV - it is a part of the Flaviviridae family, and 
its main vectors are Aedes aegypti and Ae. albopictus mosquitoes. Typically, DENV 
is found in tropical and subtropical regions and unlike other viruses, individuals 
may be re-infected by different serotypes. This is especially important in public 
health prevention programs and epidemic mitigations. Unfortunately, individuals 
infected with one serotype only produce antibodies capable of neutralizing that 
specific serotype, leaving the individual unprotected against the other 3 serotypes. 
Moreover, through antibody-dependent enhancement, re-infection by a different 
serotype increases the risk of severe dengue disease [26]. In 2019 a vaccine against 
DENV was approved for individuals aged 9–45 years and who had experienced a 
prior DENV infection. However, providing this vaccine to individuals without prior 
DENV infection also increases the risk for the antibody-dependent enhancement 
and therefore greatly limiting who may be immunized [30]. In a pandemic scenario 
this limitation would be disastrous.
3.1.1.3 Zika virus
One of the most famous infectious diseases of recent decades, Zika came into 
the international spotlight during its 2015 epidemic. Although Zika virus (ZIKV) 
was discovered in a Ugandan forest over 50 years ago, in 2015 it emerged as a global 
epidemic affecting multiple countries and causing widespread panic [31]. In 2016, 
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the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak as a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern, with ZIKV affecting throughout the Americas 
and Caribbean. One of the main reasons for the declaration and widespread worry 
is the increase in microcephaly cases and other neurological disorders that ZIKV 
brought with it. Interestingly, prior to the outbreaks in the recent decade, ZIKV 
infections were considered benign [32]. It was the increase in neurological disorders 
such as Guillain-Barré syndrome in older children and adults and microcephaly 
and other birth defects in newborns in the 2015 Brazil outbreak that forewarned 
the local and international community of the potential adverse effects from a ZIKV 
infection [32]. Although the incidence of Zika cases has decreased since the 2015–
2016 epidemic, a substantial amount of Zika research continues to provide new data 
and information on this infectious disease. Current research suggest Zika will be 
around until the foreseeable future with research indicating ZIKV actually circu-
lates in areas previously unknown. Moreover, in 2019 Europe’s first autochthonous 
case [31] was identified and further confirmed the importance of vector control 
and public health programs. Like the flaviviruses mentioned above, ZIKV’s main 
vectors are Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus placing a large proportion of the global 
population at risk of infection; therefore, threatening International Health Security 
[31, 33]. Although Aedes mosquitos are the confirmed vector for ZIKV, Culex genera 
mosquitoes, mostly Culex quinquefasciatus, are theorized to be capable to transmit 
Zika, further expanding its geographic reach [34]. However, recent studies did not 
support the ability for Culex mosquitoes to transmit ZIKV [35, 36]. In conjunction 
with its vectors wide global reach, a high proportion of Zika cases are asymptomatic 
and those who are symptomatic mirror symptoms to dengue and the flu (e.g., fever, 
rash, muscle and joint pain) compounding the barriers to diagnosis, treatment, and 
epidemic mitigation efforts.
3.1.1.4 West Nile Virus
An emerging zoonotic arbovirus, West Nile Virus (WNV), was first described 
in a sick woman located in the West Nile Uganda district in 1937 [37]. Sixteen years 
later WNV was detected in birds living in the Nile delta region, suggesting its 
transmission cycle involves mosquito vectors and birds – yet may infect humans 
[38]. It is now known WNV is capable of infecting both humans and other ver-
tebrate species, with its sylvatic cycle infecting horses and humans as dead-end 
hosts and birds as the amplifying host. Unlike the previously mentioned viruses, 
WNV uses the Culex genus mosquitoes as its primary vector. Recently, additional 
mosquito genera, Aedes and Ochlerotatus, were identified as possible WNV vec-
tors. Although this virus historically caused outbreaks in Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East, cases of WNV are now common in Europe and the Americas. The 
first US case occurred in 1999 and within a decade cases were identified in Canada, 
Mexico, and South America – with cases as south as Argentina [37]. WNV has 
spread to all continents except Antarctica, increasing the risk of future and larger 
epidemics worldwide. WNV is now considered endemic in the US with as many as 
47 US states reporting WNV cases each year [38]. Although the incidence of WNV 
has increased throughout the decades, most human WNV infection are asymptom-
atic [39]. About 1% of infected individuals experience severe neuroinvasive disease 
such as meningitis, encephalitis, and flaccid paralysis [39, 40]. The movement of 
migratory birds in addition to the local movement of sedentary birds are hypoth-
esized to contribute to the global distribution of WNV [38]. Current public health 
programs aiming to reduce the spread of WNV rely on GIS and mosquito popula-
tion control techniques. Furthermore, since WNV is able to infect horses and birds, 
many endemic areas have equine and sentinel programs focused on surveillance 
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and monitoring of WNV transmission. Moreover, recent mathematical and GIS 
models identified risk factors pushing WNV transmission such as populations 
living in poverty, environmental factors, and mosquito populations [41]. There 
are no current approved vaccines against WNV, leaving public health prevention 
programs and vector surveillance the main barrier between WNV causing larger 
human outbreaks.
3.1.1.5 Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus
A Nairovirus, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), is an emerging 
infectious disease using Hyalomma genus ticks as its vector with distribution in 
Africa, Asia, and Europe [42]. CCHF was first described in the Crimean Peninsula 
less than a century ago, in 1944, during World War II when cases were brought on 
Soviet soldiers. Since then, the importance of CCHF has grown so much so that in 
the last 3 years the WHO considers it one of eight priority emergent pathogens [42]. 
Currently this zoonotic virus is endemic in approximately 50 countries throughout 
the world. Domesticated animals such as sheep, cattle, and goats as well as birds 
serve as the amplifying host, maintaining the transmission cycle alive in diverse 
regions. The Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus is transmitted to humans 
mainly through the bite of hard-bodied ticks yet can be transmitted with direct 
contract with blood and other infected bodily fluids. An infection typically comes 
directly from an infected tick or ticks on livestock that then bite humans. For those 
reasons many CCHF cases originate in individuals in agricultural jobs (direct) and 
nosocomial environments (direct bodily fluid contact). Most cases are asymptom-
atic or present mild symptoms such as fever, headaches, dizziness, and abdominal 
pain and myalgia [43]. In severe cases the course of infection includes an incubation 
period, pre-hemorrhagic, hemorrhagic, and convalescent phases [43, 44]. It is 
estimated approximately 10% of the cases will present severe disease with mortality 
rates ranging from 20- to over 30% in these severe cases [44]. Due to high mortal-
ity rates and global risk, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
considers CCHF virus a level 4 biosecurity risk pathogen [42]. There is currently 
no approved CCHF vaccine and treatment is usually supportive and symptomatic 
[42]. Fortunately, the current geographic distribution of the Hyalomma tick is 
limited to 50 degrees north latitude [45], preventing the disease to expand beyond 
this geographical limitation for now. Nonetheless, the climate change and increased 
environmental temperatures may provide the vector an opportunity to expand 
its traditional reach which may become an International Health Security threat. 
Consequently, CCHF prevention focuses on public health education, environmental 
programs, and physical barriers (e.g., thick clothing, long sleeve shirts, long sleeve 
bottoms) [43].
3.1.1.6 Mayaro virus
This emerging zoonotic pathogen is an enveloped +ssRNA virus belonging to 
the alphavirus genus of Togaviridae family [46]. Mayaro virus (MAYV) is part of 
the viruses of Semliki forest antigenic complex and causes Mayaro fever [46, 47]. 
Transmission of MAYV into humans occurs primarily through the bites of infected 
mosquitoes of the genus Haemagogus spp., especially Haemagogus janthinomys, with 
experimental studies showing the ability of MAYV to infect mosquitoes of another 
genus such as Aedes aegypti, Culex, Mansonia, Psorophora, and Sabethes [46, 48]. 
The sharing of common antigenic sites among viruses of Semliki complex causes 
serological misdiagnosis and underreporting of MAYV infection in endemic areas  
[46, 49]. MAYV infection produces self-limiting symptoms of fever, headache, 
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myalgia, arthralgias, maculopapular rash with more than 50% of them developing 
long-term incapacitating arthralgias. Sometimes Mayaro fever can result in compli-
cations resulting in hemorrhagic manifestations, neurological manifestations, myo-
carditis, intermittent fever, and death [46, 49]. Pharmaceutical countermeasures 
such as specific antiviral agent or licensed vaccine are not available against MAYV. 
Thus, prevention and control of MAYV infection is dependent on vector control 
techniques and barriers to prevent human-vector contact. This neglected tropical 
virus was first isolated from the sera of forest workers of Mayaro county, Trinidad 
and Tobago in August–September 1954 [50]. Even earlier evidence of transmission 
of MAYV in Panama and Colombia between 1904 and 1914 was provided by a retro-
spective study [51]. This was followed by reporting of MAYV infection in Brazil, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Surinam, Peru, Ecuador, French Guinea, Venezuela, and Haiti 
[46, 52]. Currently, the pathogen is endemic in regions of Central Brazil and the 
western coast of South America [52]. The import of MAYV cases in North America, 
Netherlands, France, and Germany in last decade shows the potential of travelling 
in introduction of agent in new areas [46, 52]. Infection with MAYV is detected in 
many vertebrate hosts such as nonhuman primates, rodents, sloths, small mam-
mals, and birds with nonhuman primates (monkeys) being suspected of maintain-
ing the enzootic cycle [46, 47]. The zoophagous nature of the Heamagogus spp. 
species results in the restriction of MAYV to rural areas with occasional outbreaks 
in humans [49]. However, the ability of MAYV to infect urban vectors like Aedes 
(Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus) suggest a potential future expansion and invasion 
of MAYV into urban areas of the world becoming an International Health Security 
threat [46, 52]. Anthropogenic changes, genomic mutations, insecticide resistance 
in vectors, globalization, climate change, and infection of urban mosquito vectors 
could result in epidemiological evolution of MAYV and MAYV fever becoming an 
International Health Security threat.
3.1.1.7 Chikungunya virus
First reported in 1952 in Tanzania, Chikungunya virus (CHIKV) is an alpha 
virus apart of the Togoviridae family and transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes [53]. 
The word Chikungunya translates as “the disease that bends up the joints”, which 
is one of the severe symptoms of the disease (i.e., arthritis) [54]. The main trans-
mission among humans occurs through epizootic cycles, where vertebrates are 
the viral reservoirs and the mosquito acts as the vector [55]. Since its discovery, 
there were CHIKV outbreaks throughout Europe, India, and Asia. CHIKV was a 
mostly a forgotten infectious disease until its 2006 resurgence and widened global 
reach. In 2007, Europe reported its first autochthonous CHIKV infection and by 
2013 it had found the Americas, first landing in Saint Martin and then spreading 
throughout South America [53]. In spite of underreporting and misdiagnoses cases 
have occurred in more than 45 countries [55]. Active outbreaks allow humans to 
become the reservoirs and continue to fuel the outbreak. Like Zika, the first autoch-
thonous cases in the Americas were fairly recent, with CHIKV’s first outbreak in 
the Northern and Northeastern regions of Brazil [53]. The most serious outbreak 
was probably the Reunion Island outbreak between 2005 and 2006, where nearly 
a third of the island’s population (255,000) was infected and over 250 individuals 
died [56]. A CHIKV infection typically causes symptoms such as fever, arthralgia, 
myalgias, and skin rashes [55]. In a subset of cases, joint inflammation and arthritis 
lasting up to 4 months may occur [55]. The increased incidence of CHIKV over the 
recent decades in areas previously unaffected, in addition to the wide geographi-
cal range of its vector (i.e., the Aedes genus) lead to heightened concern of future 
outbreaks and adverse health outcomes. Moreover, recently CHIKV infection is 
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associated with abortion during the first and last trimesters of pregnancy, further 
emphasizing the need for CHIKV research and therapeutics [55].
3.1.2 Bacteria
3.1.2.1 Rickettsia prowazekii
As one of oldest infectious diseases known to mankind, Typhus, caused by the 
bacteria Rickettsia prowazekii and R. typhi, continues to be an International Health 
Security threat. Due to the nature of the outbreaks caused by R. prowaszekii, having 
higher mortality rates [57] and a recently discovered animal reservoir (i.e., flying 
squirrel) [58, 59], only R. prowazekii will be covered in this section. R. prowazekii’s, 
the cause of epidemic typhus, history is unclear. Some scholars believe epidemic 
typhus to be have caused the 430 BC plague of Athens [57, 60, 61] where it killed 
25% of the population [61]. While the origins of this pathogens may be unclear, 
it is certain it continues to be part of an International Health Security program 
today. Typhus is also referred to as a pestilential disease, or an infectious disease 
killing a large number of individuals, that is commonly used in old world diseases. 
Epidemic typhus is usually associated with cold months and poor sanitary condi-
tions are conducive to lice proliferation [60]. Until the late 1900s, Pediculus humanus 
corporis (i.e., human body lice) was thought to be the only vector for R. prowazekii 
until the late 1970s when a US outbreak seemed to inculpate Glaucomys Volans (i.e., 
southern flying squirrel) [58, 59]. Infection occurs when an infected human body 
louse defecates on an individual and its feces, containing R. prowazekii, enters the 
bite site or wound [57, 60]. Transmission via flying squirrel is not yet completely 
understood [60], however it is thought to spread through aerosolized ectoparasite 
feces [57, 60]. Currently, epidemic typhus is endemic in South America, Africa, and 
Asia [57, 60]. Outbreaks propagate especially following famines, climate changes, 
wars, and social unrest all of which are currently present in the world [57, 60]. One 
of the most recent largest outbreaks was reported during the Burundi civil war in 
1997, where approximately 100,000 individuals were infected and the case fatality 
rate was 15% [60]. Clinical manifestation of Typhus includes skin rashes (crucial 
for clinical diagnosis), fever, headaches, and cough [57, 60]. Without treatment, 
the case fatality rate could be as high as 60%, however, currently with treatment 
is closed to 4% [60]. Unlike the previously mentioned pathogens, once infected 
with R. prowazekii individuals may stay infected for life. This is even more alarm-
ing given a recrudescence may cause Brill-Zinsser disease [57, 60, 62]. Currently, 
epidemic typhus is treated using antibiotics (doxycycline) and there is no approved 
vaccine. Given infection by inhalation it is possible R. prowazekii may be used 
as a biological weapon and is warrants additional research and funding [60, 63, 
64]. With the current International Health events including refugee camps, wars, 
and populations living in unsanitary condition, epidemic typhus may continue to 
produce outbreaks similar to the Burundi outbreak and therefore vaccine develop-
ment should be encouraged.
3.1.2.2 Yersinia pestis
Perhaps the most infamous infectious disease, the Black Plague or Black Death, 
is caused by Yersinia pestis. Y. pestis, a bacterium, has caused multiple plagues 
throughout the history of mankind [60, 64]. The earliest epidemic caused by Y. 
pestis killed approximately 30 to 50 million people in the 541–542 AD Plague of 
Justinian [64]. Since then, there were four additional pandemics caused by this 
pathogen, the Black death (1347–1351), Italian plague (1629–1631), Great plague of 
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London (1664–1666), and the Third plague (1885) [64]. In total, the five pandem-
ics caused by Y. pestis are estimated to have killed over 250 million people. Cases 
of the plague still exist, yet the discovery of antibiotics has greatly reduced the 
global burden of this disease [60]. There are five forms of plague, all affecting the 
human body differently and having different mortality rates, bubonic, septicemic, 
pneumonic, meningeal, and pharyngeal [64]. However, there are typically three 
types of plagues described in the literature and main causes of outbreaks: bubonic, 
septicemic, and pneumonic [64, 65]. Today most human cases of plague are of the 
bubonic or pneumonic form, caused by spillover of an infected flea (bubonic) or by 
the inhalation of infectious droplets (pneumonic) [66]. The transmission of Y. pestis 
relies on rats (Rattus rattus) and its ectoparasite the rat flea (Xenopsylla pheopis). 
Conversely, in 1941 body lice and human fleas were found to be infected with the 
plague, indicating other vectors may exist. Currently there are no documented 
cases of plague being transmitted by body lice or human fleas to humans [66], 
yet some scholars suggest previous epidemics were caused by plague infected lice 
based on genomic evidence and paleomicrobiology [60]. Buboes or swollen lymph 
nodes are classical characteristics for Bubonic plague and typically are transmitted 
from rodents [66]. Septicemic plague is a severe form of bubonic plague where the 
bacteria enter the blood stream. Pneumonic plague affects the lungs and is trans-
mitted by aerosolized bacteria [66]. Due to the respiratory nature of pneumonic 
plague, pneumonic plague can be spread person to person yet usually the high case 
fatality rates end the outbreaks quickly [66]. The case fatality rate, in the absence 
of treatment, for pneumonic plague can near 100%, while bubonic plague being 
around 40–70%, and septicemic around 50% [65, 66]. As mentioned, the plague 
took millions of live throughout the history of mankind and continues to do so to 
this day. The largest (n = 2348 cases) latest outbreak occurred in Madagascar late in 
2017, with 70% of the cases diagnosed as pneumonic plague and 202 deaths occur-
ring [67]. While the probability of a pandemic caused by the plague has decreased, 
a recently discovered multidrug resistant strains of Y. pestis has raised alarms for 
potential future outbreaks becoming of International Health Security concern [65, 
67]. The Madagascar strain (MDR Y. pestis plasmid pIP1202) was found to be resis-
tant to eight common antibiotics (i.e., streptomycin, chloramphenicol, tetracycline, 
sulfonamides, ampicillin, kanamycin, spectinomycin, and minocycline) [68, 69]. 
Currently, there are still antibiotics (e.g., doxycycline) successful in treating MDR 
plague. Moreover, the high mortality rate in conjunction with the ability to be trans-
mitted person-to-person leads Y. pestis to be classified as a Category A biothreat 
agent (i.e., high priority agent) [70, 71]. Without an approved vaccine available and 
the presence of a multidrug resistant plague, the Black Death may re-emerge from 
the history books.
3.1.2.3 Francisella tularensis
The causative agent of tularemia, Francisella tularensis, is transmitted to humans 
by different types of arthropods (e.g., ticks, flies, mosquitoes) or ingesting con-
taminated meat or water [65, 66]. First described in the 16th century, Tularemia 
affects mostly in the northern hemisphere [67]. It is now hypothesized Tularemia 
arrived from the Middle East to Central Anatolia since 14th century BC [67]. Due 
to its survival in water and its transmission, it may also be considered a waterborne 
pathogen [66]. The two main transmission cycles, terrestrial and aquatic, utilize 
different reservoirs and vectors and are differentiated by subspecies tularensis (also 
called Type A) and holarctica (also called Type B) [65]. Type A, being terrestrial 
and using mainly ticks, mosquitoes, and flies in its transmission cycle will be cov-
ered in this section. The most understood and established vector for F. tularensis is 
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the tick (e.g., Dermacentor andersoni, D. variabilis, and A. americanum). Mosquitoes 
and flies are thought to be mechanical vectors and their role in transmission is not 
fully understood [65]. The infectious dose for contradicting tularemia is extremely 
low, with only 10 F. tularensis bacteria needed to establish an infection subcutane-
ously and 25 when in aerosol form [65]. Disease typically is one of two forms either 
the ulceroglandular form (i.e., the most common) or the typhoidal form (i.e., the 
most severe form) [65]. There is currently no vaccine available against Tularemia 
and antibiotic treatments (doxycycline and ciprofloxacin) exist [68]. Due to its 
multiple forms of transmission in addition to mortality rate (30–60%) [65, 68], the 
pathogen is considered a Category A biothreat agent and requires a level 3 bio-
containment [65, 68, 69]. This would not be the first time F. tularensis is considered 
a biological warfare agent, according to some scholars F. tularensis was used in the 
1320–1318 BC Neshite-Arzawan conflict as a biological agent [67], warranting a 
need for further research and vaccine development as it constitutes an International 
Health Security threat.
3.1.2.4 Elizabethkingia anophelis
A newly uncovered bacterium, Elizabethkingia anophelis was discovered in 
2011 in the midgut of an Anopheles gambiae mosquito [70–73]. Less than a decade 
since its discovery this pathogen has caused human disease in Asia [73–75], North 
America [76, 77], Europe [72, 78], and Africa [79]. The route of transmission 
remains unclear, although it is theorized mosquitoes transmit the bacteria to 
humans [80]. In Hong Kong there is evidence of perinatal vertical transmission [80] 
and both an outbreak in Singapore and Greece link E. anophelis cases to the water 
sources [78, 81]. The pathogen recently gained international attention by a large 
outbreak occurring in Wisconsin, USA, where over 60 cases were identified and 
18 deaths occurred [71]. Clinical symptoms may include mostly sepsis, meningitis, 
fever, bacteremia, and pneumonia [71, 72, 76, 78], among others. Currently the 
case fatality rate is estimated between 23–70% [71–74, 80]. Disease was usually 
present in neonates, the elderly, chronic illness or immunocompromised individu-
als [80]. With increasing prevalence of people with co-morbidities this agent may 
see increased cases in the years to come. Since discovery, E. anophelis is found to 
be resistant to beta-lactam antibiotics and aminoglycosides [82], yet susceptible 
to minocycline, levofloxacin, among others, complicating treatment. With less 
than a decade since its discovery there are many knowledge gaps in all aspects of 
this pathogen from transmission cycle to disease manifestations. More research 
is warranted in addition to sustaining current mosquito control programs and 
surveillance.
3.2 Airborne
In the last century, some of the deadliest pandemics were spread through respi-
ratory droplets or aerosols. Globalization and shortening of travel time have further 
increased the speed of spread of airborne diseases. Scientific advances in vaccine 
development and antimicrobials has helped to counter these outbreaks however 
risk of massive outbreaks due to emerging and re-emerging pathogens remain and 
is an International Health Security issue. The 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
pandemic has shown the susceptibility of human population to novel emerging or 
re-emerging pathogens and its significant effect on economic, social, and human 
health. It has also shown the ability of a pathogen to rapidly disseminate through 
airborne or respiratory route and the difficulties associated with prevention and 
control measures. The majority of pathogens require isolation, quarantine and 
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respiratory precautions (surgical masks, personal protective equipment in hospi-
tals, cleaning of surfaces, disinfection of surfaces, and hand hygiene) as prevention 
and control measures. Dangerous pathogens such as viruses, bacteria, or fungi 
transmitted from environment, animals or humans through respiratory route and 
having potential to cause epidemics and/or global pandemics are listed below along 
with the available medical countermeasures.
3.2.1 Viruses
3.2.1.1 Variola virus
Variola virus, a member of the Orthopoxvirus genus is the causative agent of 
smallpox. Before the 15th century, the disease was limited only to the continents 
of Europe and Asia. The smallpox was introduced into the Americas, Africa, and 
Australia between 15th and 18th century due to European colonialism and resulted 
in massive outbreaks with high case-fatality rates due to immunological naïve popu-
lations [83]. The variola virus was transmitted in humans predominantly through 
respiratory droplet nuclei. It can also transmit the infection through contact with 
body fluids, skin lesions, and scab fluids of infected person. The smallpox virus 
is limited to the human population with no animal reservoir [83, 84]. The global 
health campaign for smallpox eradication resulted in the eradication of smallpox 
in 1980 with the last natural case of smallpox in Somalia in 1977 [83]. In 1978, the 
accidental laboratory release of variola virus in Birmingham, United Kingdom 
and the resulting infection and death of a photographer due to smallpox is the last 
known death due to smallpox in the world with her mother being the last known 
case of smallpox. The eradication of smallpox was followed by cessation of smallpox 
vaccination programs and that has resulted in the mankind losing immunity to 
smallpox and other orthopoxviruses [84].
The variola virus is recognized as a huge threat to human health if used as 
bioweapon. This was based on the ability of Soviet Union to weaponize smallpox 
in the 1980s [83]. In 1994, the WHO Committee on orthopoxviruses decided, the 
stocks of variola virus DNA should be kept at only two international laboratories 
in world, namely Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (United States) and 
State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology -VECTOR institute (Russia) 
[84]. However, fear remains that secret variola virus stocks could be kept illegally 
somewhere and be used in bioterrorist attacks; therefore, it is a threat for the 
International Health Security [83]. Genomic studies on orthopoxviruses has sug-
gested the deletion of genes as an important concept for the reductive evolution 
of orthopoxviruses in adapting to new host species or emergence of new virus 
species [83, 85]. The existence of zoonotic orthopoxviruses with the ability to 
cause sporadic human cases raises the possibility of reemergence of variola virus 
as part of these natural evolution of orthopoxviruses [84]. Like the introduction 
of the smallpox in the Americas, either the release of variola virus intention-
ally or its reemergence as part of natural evolution can result in public health 
emergency of global concern with high fatality. This concern is mainly due to a 
huge proportion of the world being immunologically naïve, increased percentage 
of immunologically suppressed population, and globalization resulting in rapid 
spread of virus [83]. The effective vaccine and two antiviral drugs (brincidofovir 
and tecovirimat) are available pharmaceutical measures to fight any future 
outbreak due to either natural evolution or bioterrorist attack [83]. However, the 
lack of practical knowledge among healthcare professionals related to smallpox 
clinical characteristics may further delay early diagnosis, treatment and control 
of the outbreak.
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3.2.1.2 Monkeypox virus
Monkeypox virus, has emerged as the most common pathogenic Orthopoxvirus 
and causes a zoonotic disease Monkeypox [86]. Similar to the variola virus, 
transmission is through respiratory droplets/secretions or contact with the lesion 
material [86]. Monkeypox is endemic in Central and West Africa with similar 
clinical manifestations as smallpox and a case-fatality rate of 10% [83, 84]. The 
clinical manifestations include fever, myalgia, exhaustion followed by appearance 
of rash and lymphadenopathy in 1–3 days [86, 87]. Monkeypox virus can infect a 
wide range of mammalian species with various species of African rodents acting 
as natural reservoir [88]. Monkeypox virus usually results in sporadic cases due to 
low efficiency of person-to-person transmission and occurs mainly from primary 
human cases but never from secondary cases [83, 84, 86]. However, during the 
recent outbreaks in Nigeria and Democratic republic of Congo (DRC), increased 
person-to-person transmission was observed along with associated imported cases 
in UK, US, Israel and Singapore [83, 89]. Additionally, in the US Midwest outbreak, 
the virus showed the ability to infect intermediate hosts (prairie dogs) from natural 
reservoirs and subsequently infect humans [90]. Infection with a Orthopoxvirus or 
smallpox vaccination provided protection against monkeypox virus and thus small-
pox eradication and cessation of vaccination has resulted in decreasing number of 
vaccinated individuals [90]. Currently the monkeypox virus is in stage-3 of patho-
gen evolution to cause disease and phase-3 of WHO pandemic security alert level. 
The risk factors of absence of population-scale immunity, increasing efficiency of 
person-to-person transmission, and the presence of animal reservoir along with 
potential intermediate host suggests that monkeypox is no longer a rare disease and 
has potential to cause widespread epidemics becoming a threat for International 
Health Security. There is currently no approved antiviral or detailed case manage-
ment for monkeypox however, selective agents developed for smallpox virus could 
be tested for treatment efficacy in case of outbreaks [89].
3.2.1.3 Nipah virus
Nipah virus is an emerging zoonotic -ssRNA virus belonging to the Henipavirus 
genus and Paramyxoviridae family. The natural reservoirs of Nipah virus are the 
Pteropid bats (fruit bats) with pigs acting as intermediate hosts [91, 92]. The fruits 
bats are limited to farms and orchards in the tropical and subtropical regions of 
Asia, East Africa, and Australian continents [91, 92]. The consumption of fruits by 
pigs which are contaminated or partially eaten by the Nipah virus infected Pteropod 
bats results in the spillover of the virus to intermediate hosts [93]. The transmis-
sion of the virus from intermediate hosts to humans is through direct contact with 
the excretions and secretions of infected pigs such as urine, saliva and respiratory 
secretions [92, 93]. The animal to human route is the primary mode of transmission 
with limited person-to-person transmission through direct contact with respiratory 
droplets or fomites. The major clinical manifestation of Nipah virus infection is 
acute encephalitis with headache, fever, vomiting, and dyspnea [92].
The Nipah virus outbreaks are limited to Asian continent with Malaysia (43%), 
Bangladesh (42%), and India (15%) reporting the incident cases worldwide [92]. 
The first outbreak of Nipah virus was identified in Malaysia in 1998 which spread 
to Singapore in 1999. This was mainly due to the importation of infected pigs from 
Malaysia to Singapore and the spillover of infection among pig farmers and abattoir 
workers [94]. This was followed by outbreak in Bangladesh in 2001 and neighboring 
India. In Bangladesh cases are identified nearly every year while India has reported 
outbreaks in 2001, 2007, and 2018 [92, 93]. All the Nipah virus outbreaks reported 
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till now had limited person-to-person transmission with R0 < 1 [93]. However, due 
to the high rate of mutations in the RNA virus, it has the potential of generating a 
strain with R0 > 1 [93]. Currently the disease is in the stage-3 of pathogenic evolu-
tion with phase-3 on pandemic alert scale. There is currently no medical counter-
measure (antiviral or vaccine) approved or available against Nipah virus [92]. The 
genomic heterogeneity combined with the known susceptibility in humans and 
ability to cause person-to-person transmission suggests a future pandemic risk of 
Nipah virus and thus the listing of Nipah virus diseases as one of the WHO priority 
diseases with greatest danger for International Health Security [93, 95].
3.2.1.4 Hendra virus
Similar to the Nipah virus, Hendra virus is an emerging zoonotic pathogen 
belonging to the genus Henipavirus and family Paramyxoviridae. The Pteropid bats 
(Australian flying foxes) are the natural host with horses acting as amplifying hosts 
[91, 96]. Human disease follows transmission through contact with respiratory 
secretions of infected hosts while no person-to-person has been documented until 
now [96]. The clinical feature of Hendra virus disease in humans is acute encepha-
litis with or without influenza-like illness [96]. The first outbreak was identified 
in 1994 in Australia and the disease has been limited to Australia. There have been 
7 human cases until now with a high case-fatality rate of 57% [96]. Currently, the 
disease is limited to stage-2 of evolution with phase-2 of pandemic alert level. There 
is currently no medical countermeasure (antiviral or human vaccine) approved 
against Hendra virus; however. an equine subunit vaccine is approved in Australia 
[92, 96]. The identification of virus in horses and presence in Pteropid bats under-
pins the potential of virus to cause large outbreaks in future becoming a threat for 
International Health Security.
3.2.1.5 Influenza viruses
These are a group of four types of enveloped -ssRNA Influenza viruses (A, B, 
C and D) belonging to the Orthomyxoviridae family of virus and are the common 
etiologic agent of respiratory infections in humans [97]. The virus is transmitted 
from person-to-person through respiratory droplets or contact with fomites [68]. 
Of the four types of influenza viruses, Influenza A and B cause disease in humans 
with influenza A having the ability to infect hosts of multiple species (pigs, horses, 
aquatic birds and poultry) in addition to humans [68, 98]. Influenza A undergoes 
antigenic drift and antigenic shift and thus causes seasonal epidemics and global 
pandemics while Influenza B undergoes only antigenic drift and is responsible 
for only seasonal epidemics [68, 99]. Antigenic drift is due to point mutation and 
results in minor genomic changes while antigenic shift is due to genetic reassort-
ment and results in major genomic changes [68]. The antigenically different 18 
hemagglutinin and 11 neuraminidase proteins further divides influenza A viruses 
into various subtypes i.e. H1N1, H3N2, H5N1, H7N9, H5N8.
Influenza A viruses have caused the highest number of known global pandemics 
in human history with Spanish flu (H1N1) in 1918, Asian influenza (H2N2) in 1957, 
Hong Kong influenza (H3N2) in 1968, and Swine flu (H1N1) in 2009 [100]. The 
seasonal influenza is responsible for annual epidemics in the human population 
with approximately 5–15% of the total world population being affected annually 
[68]. The clinical features of influenza infection include myalgia, headache, fever, 
sore throat, and non-productive cough with nearly 50% of infections asymptom-
atic [98]. The worldwide dissemination of avian influenza A viruses in domestic 
poultry flocks and birds and the demonstrated ability to infect humans has raised 
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the potential of future pandemic due to avian influenza A viruses which is of main 
International Health Security concern [101]. In 1997, an outbreak of H5N1 in Hong 
Kong resulted in 18 human cases and resulted in six deaths [102]. This was followed 
by continuous circulation of H5N1 strain in China with the widespread geographical 
distribution of this epizootic strain. Between 2003 and 2009, H5N1 resulted in 4o3 
human cases with a high case fatality rate of 63%. Despite the high fatality, biologi-
cal barriers prevent efficient binging of influenza virus to human receptors and 
thus the virus continues to have inefficient person-to-person transmission [102]. 
Similar human infections resulting in small outbreaks have been seen in H5N8 and 
H7N9 strains of avian influenza A viruses [101, 102]. However, the high propen-
sity of influenza virus to undergo mutational changes may result in a complete 
species switch and lead to a pandemic which becomes an International Health 
Security threat.
M2 proton channel inhibitors (amantadine and rimantadine) and neuramini-
dase inhibitors (oseltamivir, zanamivir, peramivir) are the traditional antiviral 
drugs approved for influenza prevention and treatment [103]. All the influenza A 
viruses are resistant to M2 proton channel inhibitors making the neuraminidase 
inhibitors the drugs of choice against influenza viruses. Balovir Marboxil, a viral 
replication inhibitor was approved by FDA in 2018 but rapid emergence of resis-
tance has prevented its routine use [103]. The seasonal influenza inactivated vaccine 
requires yearly evaluation due to genomic heterogeneity and is effective mainly 
against the vaccine strains [68]. Thus, the antigenic shift that results in emergence 
of pandemic strain would make seasonal vaccines ineffective. Currently, the influ-
enza A virus are in different stages of pathogenic evolution ranging from stage-2, 
stage-3 or stage-5 and have a phase-3 or phase-5 pandemic alert level depending 
on serotype [68, 101]. The ability of influenza virus to infect multiple species, 
cross species barrier, and high genomic variability resulting in novel viruses with 
low immunity among the population are the reasons behind the constant threat of 
pandemic by influenza A viruses.
3.2.1.6 SARS-CoV-2
In 2019, a novel zoonotic beta-coronavirus (+ssRNA) emerged as the cause of 
viral pneumonia in Wuhan, China and was later named as Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome-related coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). SARS-CoV-2, the etiologic agent 
of COVID-19 is transmitted from person-to-person predominantly through respi-
ratory droplets and secretions [68, 104]. The SARS-CoV-2 causes an influenza 
like illness with severe cases presenting with dyspnea, septic shock, and acute 
respiratory distress. The mammalian reservoir for the virus is believed to be bats 
and contact with contaminated live animals is believed to be the cause of spillage 
of virus into humans [68, 104]. The virus rapidly spread globally affecting 218 
countries in 6 continents with the outbreak being declared a global pandemic by 
WHO on March 11th, 2020 [104, 105]. According to WHO, a total of 83,910,386 
cases of COVID-19 has been reported till January 4, 2021 with 1,839,660 of them 
having fatal outcome. A new variant of SARS-CoV-2 known as B.1.1.7 emerged in 
the United Kingdom in late September, 2020 due to N501Y mutation and has nearly 
71% (95% CI: 67%–75%) higher rate of transmission than previous variant [106]. 
As of January 4th, 2021, three types of vaccines have been approved in United States 
and United Kingdom for emergency use for prevention of COVID-19 [107, 108]. 
This includes the mRNA vaccine by Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna and non-replicating 
vector vaccine by AstraZeneca/University of Oxford [107, 108]. Additionally, the 
Russian Sputnik (vector) and Chinese Sinopharm (inactivated) vaccines have 
been approved in other parts of world to fight the COVID-19 pandemic [109, 110]. 
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Antiviral remdesivir is the only therapeutic agent approved by FDA against SARS-
CoV-2 with baricitinib currently under emergency use authorization for therapy 
in combination with remdesivir [111]. Currently, the SARS-CoV-2 pathogen is in 
the stage-5 of pathogenic evolution with ongoing global pandemic and becoming a 
menace for International Health Security. Despite the authorization of vaccine, the 
challenges associated with logistics of vaccination and emergence of new variants 
of SARS-CoV-2 suggests that SARS-CoV-2 will continue to be an agent of public 
health concern for years to come.
3.2.1.7 SARS-CoV-1
The first of the beta-coronavirus (+ssRNA) to emerge in Guangdong Province, 
China by zoonotic transmission was called Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-
related Coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and was responsible for the 2002/2003 Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak [68, 104]. The SARS-CoV-1 causes 
symptoms similar to SARS-CoV-2. The main mammalian reservoir host of this 
virus were bats with Asian civet cat believed be to the source of initial human 
infection [104]. The person-to-person transmission occurred due to contact with 
respiratory droplets or fomites. The epidemic started in November 2002 and spread 
rapidly to 29 countries in 5 continents resulting in 8437 cases and 813 deaths [68]. 
The outbreak was contained in July 2003 and since 2004 no cases of SARS has 
been reported [104]. Currently, there is no known transmission of SARS-CoV-1 to 
humans (stage-1) and it has a phase-1 pandemic alert level.
3.2.1.8 MERS-CoV
In 2012, a novel beta-coronavirus was identified to be the causative agent for 
acute respiratory disease in humans in Saudi Arabia and was named Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [104, 112]. Bats are the 
main mammalian reservoir for MERS-CoV with dromedary camels as the source 
of human infection [104, 112]. This enveloped +ssRNA virus is transmitted from 
animals to human through close contact with infected dromedary camels and/or 
person-to-person through respiratory droplets [104, 112]. The majority of cases 
of MERS-CoV are limited to Middle East with the lack of rapid global spread due 
to poor efficiency of person-to-person transmission [104]. MERS-CoV infection 
results in symptoms similar to other beta-coronaviruses and range from mild 
influenza like illness to severe disease with respiratory distress, septic shock, and 
multi-organ failure [112]. The initial case in 2012 was followed by an outbreak 
in Middle East in 2014 impacting 27 countries in Europe, Asia, Middle East, and 
North America with cases related to Middle East travel history [104]. The associ-
ated Korean outbreak in 2015 was precipitated due to a super spreader event with 
the individual having travel history to Middle Eastern countries [104, 112]. Till 
December 2019, a total of 2499 confirmed cases and 858 deaths have been reported 
due to MERS-CoV [68]. Research studies have shown the natural susceptibility 
among Alpacas and Llamas camelids to MERS-CoV [113, 114]. This raises the 
potential of widening of the geographic distribution of MERS-CoV to the South 
American region with high new world camelids population (Peru, Argentina, 
Chile, Bolivia) if the virus is introduced to these regions, becoming a threat for 
International Health Security in the Americas. Currently, the virus in stage-3 of 
pathogenic evolution and phase-3 of pandemic alert level. The lack of vaccine or 
treatment along with the potential for viral mutation that could increase zoonotic 
and/or person-to-person transmission may increase the epidemic potential of 
MERS-CoV and cause an International Health Security threat.
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3.2.1.9 Hantavirus
Different than any previously mentioned pathogens, Hantaviruses are an entire 
genus capable of causing human diseases. In 1981, this group of -ssRNA viruses 
were introduced into the Bunyaviridae family [115]. Before 1993, Hantaviruses were 
thought to be solely responsible to cause hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome 
(HRFS) in old world [115]. The main reservoirs for this type of viruses are rodents 
such as Cricetidae and Muridae. In 1993, the first new world Hantavirus was found 
in the Southwestern region of the US. This virus would later be named Sin Nombre 
virus (SNV) and be known to cause hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HPS) 
[115]. Since the discovery of SNV, the hantavirus genus includes more than 20 
species and 30 genotypes [115]. Scientists have identified the deer mouse as the 
major host of SNV with cases confirmed in at least 30 US states [116]. The transmis-
sion of virus in humans is predominantly through inhalation of aerosolized rodent 
urine or salivary droppings. The pulmonary syndrome presents flu-like symptom 
lasting 3 to 5 days and after 7 days the cardiopulmonary phase may begin [115, 116]. 
Unfortunately, diagnosis of HPS has proved difficult and leads to misdiagnosis 
and underreporting [116]. Currently, the SNV has a high case fatality rate of 35% 
with no licensed antivirals or vaccine. Since close contact with or among rodents 
account for majority of exposures, rodent prevention and population surveillance 
is essential for transmission control. In 1996, a study found evidence of person-to-
person transmission of another hantavirus in Argentine, raising concern of larger 
outbreaks in future [117]. Luckily person-to-person transmission is rare, if non-
existent suggesting pathogen is in stage-2 of pathogenic evolution and thus, phase-2 
of pandemic alert level. Yet, recent outbreaks of other Hantaviruses (e.g., Andes 
virus) are an alarm for International Health Security surveillance systems who 




This gram-negative bacillus is commonly found in environment and is the 
etiologic agent of a serious disease “Melioidosis” in humans and animals [118]. The 
agent was first identified in 1911 in Burma but was named Burkholderia pseudomal-
lei in 1992 [119]. Melioidosis, also known as “Whitmore disease” mimics various 
other diseases such as community-acquired pneumonia, tuberculosis and sepsis 
and has a case fatality rate of 10–40% in humans [120–122]. Infection with B. 
psuedomallei is seen in numerous wild and domestic animal species with most cases 
seen in pigs, sheep, and goats [123]. The disease was first identified in Australia in 
1950 and is currently endemic in Northern Australia and South East Asia [119, 120, 
122]. In addition to the endemic areas, sporadic cases of B. pseudomallei occur in 
non-endemic areas of Central America, South America, and Africa and result in an 
estimated 165,000 cases per year worldwide with 89,000 of these cases having fatal 
outcomes [119, 122]. The predominant method of transmission is percutaneous 
inoculation, inhalation of aerosols, or ingestion of contaminated water with rare 
incidence of placental transmission [118–120]. B. pseudomallei infects both humans 
and animals but very rarely there is person-to-person, animal-to-animal or zoonotic 
transmission [120, 123]. The infectious form of B. pseudomallei can persist for 
prolonged periods in the environmental with soil or water acting as reservoir [123]. 
Improvement in diagnostic facilities and risk factors such as increased diabetes 
prevalence, anthropogenic changes, and globalization of humans and animals 
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may result in increase in infections by B. pseudomallei [123]. The lack of animal to 
humans or person-to-person transmission suggest the gram-negative bacteria is in 
stage-1 of pathogenic evolution. In the US, melioidosis is not a nationally notifi-
able disease but B. pseudomallei is a tier-1 select agent with a potential for use as a 
bioweapon due to its ability to infect humans and animals [123]. B. pseudomallei 
is resistant to penicillin, ampicillin, 1st and 2nd generation cephalosporins, and 
aminoglycosides like gentamycin, tobramycin and streptomycin. The therapeutic 
management consists of an 10–15 days intensive therapy with ceftazidime or 
carbapenems (meropenem/imipenem) followed by eradication therapy with 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole [124]. The increase in areas with endemicity and 
susceptibility to infections in large number of species suggests a future risk in 
increase in reported cases and thus warrants increased awareness and attention 
from International Health Security experts. The lack of vaccine and long-term phar-
maceutical therapy would further complicate the response in case of an outbreak.
3.2.2.2 Coxiella burnetti
Coxiella burnetti, the causative agent of Q fever in humans is an intracellular 
gram-negative coccobacilli that occurs in all geographic regions of the world 
except New Zealand [125–127]. The main reservoir of C. burnetti are cattle, sheep, 
and goats with marine mammals, birds, and arthropods reported to harbor the 
bacterium [127, 128]. Ticks are the main source of transmission of the bacterium in 
domestic animals but are not the source of transmission in humans [125]. Human 
Q fever is a worldwide zoonosis transmitted due to the inhalation of aerosolized 
bacteria from the environment. The bacterium is mostly spread in the environ-
ment due to shedding of bacteria in mammalian birth products, milk, feces, and 
urine with the bacterium surviving in the environment for long period [125, 128]. 
There have been only anecdotal reports of person-to-person transmission [127, 128] 
suggesting the pathogen is currently in stage 2 of evolution. The epidemiological 
profile of C. burnetti differs by countries and ranges from sporadic cases such as in 
US marines in Iraq, an epidemic in Cayenne, French Guiana, a major outbreak in 
Netherlands from 2007–2010, and a hyperendemic situation in Africa [127–129]. 
The widespread geographical distribution of C. burnetti, the recent outbreaks and 
description of disease in South-East Asia, India, and Brazil suggest the disease is 
very common cause of fever in the inter-tropical areas [127, 128]. The strains of 
C. burnetti resistant to doxycycline and erythromycin has been reported in many 
endemic areas of the world however most isolates still remain susceptible to doxy-
cycline, fluoroquinolones, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole [128]. The CDC has 
recently classified C. burnetti as select agent with potential to be used as in bio-
weapon [128]. Currently, C. burnetti causes zoonotic diseases but has not resulted in 
human-to-human transmission and thus is at the phase-3 of WHO pandemic alert 
level. The ability of C. burnetti to infect wide range of vertebrate and invertebrate 
hosts, persist in environment for long time, and cause massive outbreaks such as 
in Netherlands suggest that C. burnetti could become a major International Health 
Security threat in future with potential to cause pandemics.
3.2.2.3 Bacillus anthracis
This gram-positive spore forming bacilli is the causative agent of anthrax, a 
zoonotic disease which is rare in humans and common in animals. Human anthrax 
is a highly contagious disease and can be transmitted from animals to human 
through contact with infected animal or animal products or ingestion of animal 
meat. However, this highly virulent disease has no documented person-to-person 
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transmission [68, 130]. Herbivores animals are the primary reservoir of anthrax 
with all warm blood animals susceptible to B. anthracis infection [130]. Depending 
on the method of entry of the pathogenic endospores (inhalation, ingestion, skin), 
the disease can have respiratory (5%), cutaneous (94%), and gastrointestinal (1%) 
forms [130].
Worldwide approximately 20,000–100,000 cases of anthrax are reported annu-
ally, with the disease a major threat in arid regions of Central Asia, Africa, Middle 
East, Haiti, and South America [68, 131]. In the US, a total of 18 cases of inhala-
tional anthrax and no case of gastrointestinal anthrax has been reported in the 20th 
century [132]. The largest outbreak of human anthrax was reported in Soviet Union 
in 1979, due to ingestion or contact with contaminated meat. The spores of the 
bacilli are resistant to environmental conditions such as drying, heating, ultraviolet 
(UV) rays, and gamma radiation and can survive for decades [68, 130]. This makes 
B. anthracis a major biological risk with a potential to be used in bioterrorist attack. 
In October–November 2001, intentional release of anthrax resulted in 22 cases of 
inhalational or cutaneous anthrax in US [133]. The drug of choice for treatment 
is oral or intravenous doxycycline or ciprofloxacin with the vaccine having no 
efficacy in post-exposure prophylaxis [130]. The causative agent is sensitive to most 
antibiotics with the exception of 3rd generation cephalosporins and trimethoprim-
sulfamethoxazole but requires long duration of treatment due to endospores [130]. 
Currently, the disease in in stage-2 of evolution of pathogenic microbe resulting 
in limited animal to human outbreaks and phase-2 pandemic security level. This 
combination of factors such as high virulence, persistence in environment, and 
the fact that it has already been weaponized makes B. anthracis a major concern for 
International Health Security.
3.2.2.4 Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Tuberculosis (TB) is a chronic inflammatory disease caused by an acid-fast 
bacilli Mycobacterium tuberculosis. In addition to M. tuberculosis, M. bovis a member 
of the Mycobacteriaceae genus also can cause TB infection [134]. With the advent 
of antibiotics, public health experts believed they had achieved control over TB 
however, the emergence of HIV pandemic in 1980s resulted in the re-emergence of 
TB [135]. In 2019, TB was the infectious disease responsible for the largest number 
of deaths due to communicable diseases worldwide [136]. The M. tuberculosis bacilli 
is transmitted from person-to-person through small droplet nuclei while M. bovis is 
a zoonotic disease transmitted from cow to humans through ingestion of unpasteur-
ized milk [134, 137]. M. tuberculosis has also shown to have bidirectional transmis-
sion between elephants and humans i.e. reverse zoonosis and zoonosis [138, 139]. 
The zoonosis- reverse zoonosis transmission is mainly possible due to close contact 
between humans and elephants during training of elephants, living in close proxim-
ity, and cleaning of barn [138, 139]. The inappropriate usage of antimycobacterial 
agents and antibiotics associated selective pressure led to the emergence of drug 
resistance strains of M. tuberculosis. Multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) is defined 
as resistance to isoniazid and rifampicin, two of the first line antimycobacterial 
agents. Additionally, selective strains of bacteria have emerged with resistance 
to even second line antimycobacterial agents causing extensively drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (XDR-TB) and some with total lack of susceptibility to antimycobacte-
rial agents causing total drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) [140]. MDR-TB chemo-
therapy consists of drugs with severe toxicity to be given for 18–24 months and thus 
MDR-TB is associated with significant morbidity and mortality.
TB affects all regions of the world with nearly a quarter of the world’s population 
infected with M. tuberculosis [136]. In 2017, worldwide TB incidence was 10 million 
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with 1.57 million fatal outcomes [136]. Approximately 5.6% of the total TB cases 
and 3.6% of the incident cases were MDR-TB [136]. Nearly 70% of the global 
burden of TB was found in South-East Asia and Africa with India, China, and 
Russia having more than 50% of the global burden of MDR-TB [140]. Only 57% of 
all MDR-TB cases receives and completes treatment [140]. Tuberculosis is primar-
ily a disease transmitted airborne from person-to-person and thus is in stage-5 of 
pathogenic evolution. MDR-TB continues to be a threat to public health and inter-
national security due to the concerns related to long duration of chemotherapy, lack 
of safe and effective antimycobacterial agents, morbidity, mortality, socioeconomic 
impact, airborne transmission and recent zoonotic-reverse zoonosis transmission. 




Candida auris is an emerging pathogenic yeast belonging to the genus Candida 
and is responsible for multidrug-resistant invasive infections in nosocomial settings 
[141–143]. The species has been mainly isolated from nosocomial environment, where 
it survives for a long time and can form biofilms resulting in inter and intra-nosoco-
mial transmissions [141, 142, 144]. Candida auris was first identified in 2009 in Japan 
and has rapidly spread to five continents (North America, South America, Europe, 
Asia and Africa) becoming an International Health Security threat [143, 145]. 
 C. auris infections has been identified in Australia, Bangladesh, Kuwait, India, 
Japan, Pakistan, Oman, Singapore, Iran, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, 
Chile, United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Israel, France, and the 
Netherlands [141–143]. The emergence of C. auris has been attributed to widespread 
usage of antimicrobial (antibiotics and antifungal) agents and rising ambient 
temperatures [141]. C. auris results in skin or mucosal colonization in patients with 
the organisms being recovered from physical surfaces such as furniture, medical 
equipment or sinks [141, 142]. No animal or environmental reservoir for C. auris 
has yet been identified. Previous [141] studies done in the United Kingdom, India 
and United States suggest community transmission and community reservoir are 
unlikely [141]. However, C. auris has a very efficient person-to-person transmission 
that allows it to spread rapidly among patients [141, 142, 144]. The person-to-person 
transmission and presence of yeast on surfaces suggest a potential respiratory drop-
let mode of transmission but no specific mode of transmission has been established 
yet [141, 142].
One unique feature that differentiates C. auris from other Candida spp. is its 
ability to cause invasive infections in individuals with normal neutrophil counts 
[144]. This is due to the reduced activity of human neutrophils against C. auris lead-
ing to poor outcomes [144]. Individuals requiring multiple medical procedures that 
results in prolonged hospital stay such as surgical procedures, cardiac catherization, 
endoscopic gastrotomy tube insertion and mechanical ventilation are at higher 
risk of C. auris infections [146, 147]. Infection or colonization with C. auris is also 
found frequently in patients with co-morbidities such as chronic/acute renal failure, 
immunosuppressive conditions/diseases, cardiovascular diseases, liver disease, 
diabetes mellitus and benign/malignant solid tumors [148]. The C. auris yeast 
exhibits a high range of antifungal resistance with resistance to fluconazole as high 
as 93% [141, 142]. Amphotericin B has a wider range of MIC and thus are less likely 
to be used as empirical therapy. Echinocandins has a more favorable susceptibility 
making it the drug of choice for C. auris infections [141, 142].
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The lack of knowledge related to any animal reservoir makes the C. auris patho-
gen currently in stage-5 (exclusive human agent) of pathogen evolvement. The 
combination of drug resistance, persistence on environmental surfaces, reduced 
neutrophil effectiveness, and rapid person-to-person transmission has resulted in 
increased nosocomial outbreaks around the world with significant mortality and 
morbidity [141, 142, 144]. Currently, these outbreaks are limited to nosocomial 
settings and thus are in Phase-3 of WHO Pandemic alerts. These factors of rapid 
transmission, outbreaks in widespread geographical regions and reduced human 
neutrophil activity makes C. auris a huge potential International Health Security 
threat in case of sustained community outbreaks.
4. Conclusions
Since ancient times, large number of pathogens (viruses, bacteria, parasites, 
fungi) found in the environment are responsible for causing severe morbidity and 
mortality. These pathogenic organisms mainly infect humans through respiratory 
droplets, aerosols, dust, vector bite, contaminated food or water, or direct contact 
with animal hosts. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in 2019 and its global spread 
resulted in the announcement of the sixth public health emergency of interna-
tional concern in last 10 years after Influenza A (H1N1) in 2009, Ebola virus in 
2014, Polio in 2014, Zika virus in 2016, and Ebola in 2019 [68]. Moreover, in the 
last 20 years the emergence of novel pathogens such as SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, 
Candida auris, and drug resistant bacteria in addition to the ongoing epidemics/
local outbreaks of vector-borne diseases such as Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic 
fever and Zika has raised International Health Security alarms. This chapter 
mainly concentrates on the epidemiology, pharmaceutical tools, prevention, 
and control of pathogens having respiratory or vector mediated transmission. 
Infectious diseases continue to be major causes of fatality worldwide despite the 
significant advances in civilization, scientific technology, and medicine. On the 
contrary, these same advances may contribute to the emergence, re-emergence, 
and rapid spread of diseases due to climate change, deforestation, globalization, 
and over usage of pharmaceutical tools. In the last few decades, the rapid emer-
gence/re-emergence of novel and resistant pathogens make it essential to establish 
surveillance and research programs into potential pandemic causing pathogens. It 
is important to take cognizance of the hazards posted by these vector-borne and 
airborne pathogens, already circulating among the animal or human population to 
prevent the risk of epidemics and global pandemics. Majority of the viruses with 
potential to cause pandemics lack antivirals and vaccines while fungi and bacteria 
have developed resistance to antimicrobials. Thus, special attention needs to be 
paid in the research and identification of effective drugs against these pathogens to 
have the medical countermeasures available to fight future pandemics and protect 
our International Health Security.
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